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Abstract.
This article examines several current risk assessment and early warning models to predict genocide
and mass atrocities. Risk assessment (RA) concerns a country’s long-term structural conditions
(regime type, state-led discrimination, etc.) that determine overall risk for atrocities. Early warning
(EW) focuses on short/midterm dynamics that can serve as triggers. The article evaluates
contemporary RA and EW forecast modeling, and asks: How well can we predict mass atrocities and
genocide? What are the strengths and limitations to current predictive modeling? Part I examines
several quantitative (statistical) RA models and identifies several strengths and limitations in current
research. Part II investigates a number of EW approaches, and also discusses their strengths and areas
for further development. The article notes the impressive advances that have been made in the past
fifteen years in RA and EW, but also counsels realistic expectations the possibilities of forecasting.
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Abstract: This article examines several current risk assessment and early warning models to predict 
genocide and mass atrocities. Risk assessment (RA) concerns a country’s long -term structural conditions 
(regime type, state-led discrimination, etc.) that determine overall risk for atrocities. Early warning (EW) 
focuses on short/midterm dynamics that can serve as triggers. The article evaluates contemporary RA and 
EW forecast modeling, and asks: How well can we predict mass atrocities and genocide? What are the 
strengths and limitations to current predictive modeling? Part I examines several quantitative (statistical) RA 
models and identifies several strengths and limitations in current research. Part II investigates a number of 
EW approaches, and also discusses their strengths and areas for further development. The article notes the 
impressive advances that have been made in the past fifteen years in RA and EW, but also counsels realistic 
expectations the possibilities of forecasting.
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Since the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides of the 1990s, policymakers have placed a premium on 
predicting and halting mass killings and genocide. Governments, human rights nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations (UN), among others, have developed a host of 
preventive policy architectures, many influenced by the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle 
articulated in 2001 and later adopted by the UN.1 These international concerns over mass killing 
have also spurred increased attention to developing sophisticated models of prediction—how 
accurately can genocide and mass killings be predicted? What are the strengths and limitations of 
predictive modeling, and what still remains to be done?
This article examines the state of genocide and mass atrocity prediction, also known as 
forecasting.2 A predictive model is part of a broader alert system that, as formulated by Lawrence 
Woocher, includes a) periodic global risk assessments that produce useful country watch lists; 
b) sustained, detailed monitoring and analysis of high risk situations; and, c) a mechanism for 
communicating warnings to end users, such as policymakers.3 This article focuses on the first two 
elements of Woocher’s list, with the understanding that forecasting is only one, albeit important, 
element in stopping mass violence more generally; clearly, the findings of researchers need to be 
useful and intelligible to policymakers and communicated in a regular and timely manner, and 
political will needs to be mobilized and sustained. Indeed, the challenge of generating political will 
may very well be the most important dimension of the preventive architecture, and it has certainly 
received the most attention from scholars, activists and political leaders.4 This article, however, 
has a more circumscribed focus. It assesses the kinds of models currently in place and identifies 
a number of strengths and limitations to predicting complex phenomena like genocide and large-
scale killing. It also raises some broader epistemological questions about prediction and counsels 
caution on expecting too great accuracy or specificity.
Barbara Harff and Birger Heldt argue that prediction models tend to fall into one of two 
categories—risk assessment (RA) or early warning (EW). Although the terms are often used 
1 Bellamy, Alex. 2009. The Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Polity. 
2 There is also a large prediction literature devoted to other kinds of risk, including environmental hazards and famine, 
that has informed mass atrocity forecasting; Secretary General of the United Nations. 2006. Early Warning Systems. New 
York: United Nations.
3 Woocher, Lawrence. 2011. “Is a Public Warning System Necessary?” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Available 
from: www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20111021-woocher-early-warning.pdf (accessed December 23 2015).
4 Meyer, Christoph O., Florian Otto, John Brante, Chiara de Franco. 2010. “Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: 
Persuasion and Preventive Policy.” International Studies Review Vol. 12, 556-578; Lupel, Adam and Ernesto Verdeja. 2013. 
“Developing the Political Will to Respond.” In Responding to Genocide: The Politics of International Action. Edited by Adam 
Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 241-257; Weiss, Thomas G. 2012. What’s Wrong with the United 
Nations and How to Fix It. London: Polity. 
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synonymously, they in fact have different objects of analysis and purposes.5 Risk assessment 
focuses on the general structural elements of a society that affect its likelihood of experiencing 
significant human rights violations. These elements may include, inter alia, political regime type 
(e.g. autocratic, democratic), prior history of political instability, degree of integration into the 
global economy, and levels of state-led discrimination. Risk assessments measure each of these 
and other factors in a particular country and generate a score of high, medium or low risk for 
violence in the future. These models are largely static: the values of the relevant factors do not tend 
to fluctuate rapidly in short periods of time—for instance, regime type is hard to change—and they 
draw on data from past periods to predict the future. Risk assessments are useful for providing an 
overall picture of the state of affairs, but do not predict if—much less when—genocidal violence or 
instability will take place. 
Early warning focuses on the mid- and short-term factors that make violence likely. This 
includes attempts to identify the escalation of instability and whether it may tip into large-
scale, sustained violence. Naturally, this requires greater attention to dynamic elements such as 
widening cleavages among political elites, changes in the military capacity of oppositional forces, 
highly contested upcoming elections, and the expansion of security forces. Early warning models 
also often track other factors that may arrest or deescalate volatile dynamics, such as the presence 
and strengthening of peacekeeping forces to reinforce stability, temporary cease-fires, and other 
short or mid-term policies that aim to create a space for political negotiation and eventual conflict 
termination or transformation. In essence, early warning focuses on processes of violence onset, 
escalation, sustainment, and abeyance, rather than the long-term structural conditions that indicate 
general risk levels of instability and violence. 
While early warnings should be “timely, accurate, valid, reliable and verifiable,” it would be 
misguided to expect that there can be highly precise predictions of when and where violence will 
occur.6 That would be too high a standard to espouse, and assumes a level of scientific accuracy 
that is unattainable. Early warning will be more useful if the focus is not on perfect forecasting, 
but instead on providing policymakers with timely and sufficiently accurate information about 
dynamics of escalation that can assist prevention or intervention. Early warning does not need to 
be perfect—it never will be—but it should be suitably concrete that it can inform policy. 
The following pages first discuss risk assessments and then move on to early warning, 
highlighting their respective strengths and limitations. The RA models discussed below are mostly 
produced by academic researchers using a variety of statistical techniques, but are meant for policy 
purposes. I focus on these models because they are among the best in the field and are transparent 
about the methods they employ, which allows readers to evaluate how they arrive at their forecasts. 
For models that integrate risk assessment and early warning (typical of governments, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations), I leave the discussion for the early warning 
section. 
Risk Assessment
Before moving on to the various risk assessment models, a few words on prediction and causation 
are in order. Risk assessments are predictive models, and not necessarily causal models. This has 
certain implications for how they frame their analyses. A causal model focuses on explaining the 
processes and mechanisms by which some factors cause some outcome, such as genocide. This 
requires specifying a chain of causality and ruling out competing causal factors, processes and 
theories. Causal theories include only those factors that can be shown to have a causal impact on 
the outcome. Predictive theories, however, are less concerned with explaining causal relations and 
5 Harff, Barbara. 2013. “Detection: The History and Politics of Early Warning.” In Responding to Genocide: The Politics of 
International Action. Edited by Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 85-110; Heldt, Birger. 2009. 
“Risks, Early Warning and Management of Atrocities and Genocide: Lessons from Statistical Research.” Politorbis Vol. 2, 
No. 47, 65-70.
6 Schmeidal, Susanne. 2002. “Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent Terminology.” In Early Warning 
and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. Edited by Ciru Mwaura and Susanne Schmeidal. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea 
Press, 81; Clarke, John. 2005. “Early Warning Analysis for Humanitarian Preparedness and Conflict Prevention.” Civil 
Wars Vol. 7, No. 1, 71-91.
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more with forecasting the probability of some event. There may be some factors that are highly 
correlated with the event and are thus useful for estimating outcome probabilities, but the factors 
do not have an obvious causal relationship to the outcome. 
The two types of enterprises—prediction and causal analysis—do overlap. Naturally, if a 
researcher knows the specific causes of some event such as genocide onset and has sufficient and 
high quality information for all of the causal factors in her model, she can in principle predict the 
event’s likelihood with some degree of accuracy. But of course, in “real time” such information 
is often imprecise, contradictory, or otherwise not fully available. And in any case, there are so 
many complex relations between structural and contingent causal factors that rough probabilities 
are the most that can be expected. Our theories on the causes of genocide are developed post-
hoc, and rely on a significant amount of historical reconstruction—through interviews, archival 
research, forensic anthropological investigations, and the like. They seek to explain how (and why) 
genocide occurs. Prediction, however, is less concerned with explanation, and thus prediction 
models such as risk assessments pragmatically use those variables that are highly correlated with 
event outcome, regardless of whether those variables have causal impact or explanatory value. As 
will be evident below, these predictive models draw heavily on the causal theory literature, but 
may also use variables that have little causal connection to genocide and mass atrocities but are 
nevertheless correlated.
The attempt to predict systematically large-scale violent phenomena has its modern origins 
in post-Cold War efforts to model the likelihood of nuclear war between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Think tanks such as RAND, funded by the US government, developed risk 
assessments that took into account the general political and economic stability and military capacity 
of each superpower, as well as their ability to control their respective allies and satellite states. 
Similar models were developed to assess the likelihood of war in the European theatre between 
NATO and Warsaw forces as well as the relative vulnerability and resilience of governments across 
the so-called Third World. Many of these models promised a degree of accuracy and predictability 
that could not be met, leading to significant skepticism about risk assessments among high-level 
US policymakers.7
The Rwandan and Bosnian genocides generated a renewed interest in risk assessments to 
assist in policy planning. In 1994, the US government established a research group to investigate 
and predict the likelihood of severe instability around the globe. Known as the Political Instability 
Task Force (PITF; originally the State Failure Task Force), the group has examined a variety of 
state failure scenarios, including rapid regime change, civil wars, and genocide and mass killing. 
The PITF is the first large-scale statistical modeling project employing large datasets to forecast 
instability. It has provided a risk assessment of all countries around the globe by examining the 
conditions that precede the onset of major instability.8 
Jack Goldstone and his colleagues use PITF data for a parsimonious model that predicts the 
onset of political instability, which they define as revolutionary and ethnic wars (at least 1,000 
total deaths and 100 deaths per year), adverse regime changes (sudden loss of authority by the 
state, or replacement by a non-democratic government), and mass atrocities (including genocide).9 
The authors experimented with a host of variables from the genocide and instability literature, 
and settled on four: regime type, infant mortality rate (logged); extent of conflict in neighboring 
countries; and extent of state-led discrimination. The authors tested the model on countries 
worldwide from 1955 to 2003 and found the model could predict (with a two-year lead time) the 
7 For the hubris of early thinking on these issues, see Edwards, Paul N. 1997. The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of 
Discourse in Cold War America. Cambridge: MIT Press.
8 The PITF data are archived at George Mason University, available at www.globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-
task-force/political-instability-task-force-home/ (accessed 10 June 2015). The Center for Systemic Peace continues to 
produce annual watch lists based on the PITF’s work, and is available at www.systemicpeace.org (accessed 10 June 2015). 
Also see the work of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/ (accessed 10 June 2015).
9 Goldstone, Jack, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Tedd Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustick, Monty G. Marshall, Jay 
Ulfelder and Mark Woodward. 2010. “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.” American Journal of Political 
Science Vol. 54, No. 1, 190-208.
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onset of political instability with over 80 percent accuracy. One of the major conclusions is that 
political institutions, rather than economic or demographic conditions or geography, serve as the 
most important predictors of political instability. 
The Goldstone et. al. model focuses on a very capacious dependent variable: political 
instability, which includes but is not limited to genocide and mass atrocities. Barbara Harff, also 
working with PITF, has developed the best-known predictive model for genocide. In 2003, Harff 
published a model that sought to predict genocide and politicide, which she defines together as 
“the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or 
their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended 
to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group”.10 The model is 
predictive for countries already experiencing state failure, essentially civil wars or “reversals” in 
democracy. She employs six causal factors, which when combined predicted geno/politicide onset 
with 74 percent accuracy, and non-onset with 73 percent accuracy. The study covers the years 
1955 to 2001. This is essentially a conditional model: it selects cases for analysis based on the prior 
condition of state failure (which may include civil war or democracy reversal). Harff respecificed 
the model in the following years, and the most recent version uses seven causal factors.11 These 
include 1) a history of prior geno/politicide since 1955; 2) ethnic character of the ruling elite (whether 
the governing elite represents a minority group); 3) exclusionary elite ideology (a ruling ideology 
that sanctions persecution or elimination of other groups); 4) regime type (autocracy or democracy, 
with autocracies more highly correlated with geno/politicide); 5) trade openness (sum of exports 
and imports as percentage of GDP, with trade openness inversely correlated with geno/politicide); 
6) state-led discrimination (systematic limitation of economic or political rights); and, 7) instability 
risks (major instabilities such as civil war, revolution or rapid change in regime). Each of these 
factors is weighted, with a higher score indicating higher risk. Countries with high cumulative 
scores are classified as having high risks of geno/politicide.12 The Harff model has served as the 
touchstone for most contemporary statistical forecasting models and was cited by the 2008 US 
Genocide Prevention Taskforce as a central component for developing genocide prevention policy, 
and is reportedly used by the US government’s Atrocities Prevention Board.13
Nicholas Rost has also developed and tested a variety of prediction models. He attempts 
to predict the onset of three violent phenomena: “mass killing” (the intentional killing by a 
government of at least 1,000 civilians), Harff’s geno/politicide, and democide, or “death by 
government.”14 Though there is significant overlap in these forms of violence, they are somewhat 
different and seem to have different predictive factors. For instance, according to Rost, a country’s 
trade dependence is correlated with democide, but not with genocide or mass killing. Furthermore, 
economic discrimination against an ethnic or communal group prior to armed conflict does not 
predict genocide, though political threats such as riots and “high-level” assassinations are in fact 
correlated. The variables with the strongest predictive power for the onset of genocide include 
regime type, interstate war, assassinations, prior limitations of rights, militarization, population 
displacement, and perhaps most surprisingly, presence of a peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping 
may be highly correlated for the simple reason that peacekeeping forces are only sent to countries 
already at risk of mass violence.15 He finds that overall, the onset of democide is significantly 
10 Harff, Barbara. 2003. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder 
since 1955.” American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No.1, 58.
11 Harff, “Detection: The History and Politics of Early Warning,” 85-110.
12 Also see Chad Hazlett’s interesting alternative model based on Harff, which drops her predictive factors of “prior 
genocides” and the “ethnic character of elites” in favor of the “strategic motivations of regimes”. Hazlett, “New Lessons 
Learned”, 2011.
13 Albright, Madeleine K. and William S. Cohen. 2008. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Washington, 
D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 25; Norris, John and Annie Malknecht. 2013. Atrocities Prevention Board: 
Background, Performance, and Option. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.
14 Rost, Nicolas. 2013. “Will It Happen Again? On the Possibility of Forecasting the Risk of Genocide.” Journal of Genocide 
Research Vol. 15, No. 1, 42, 52-53.
15 The relation between peacekeeping and genocide and armed conflict is complex, but see Melander, Erik. 2009. “Selected 
To Go Where Murderers Lurk? The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians.” Conflict Management 
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harder to predict that genocide or mass killing, and notes a high rate of false alarms in the various 
models he examines.
Benjamin Goldsmith, director of the Australian Atrocity Forecasting Project, and his colleagues 
have produced a statistical forecasting model that builds on the work of Harff and others.16 Their 
model is essentially two-stage: first, it predicts a country’s probability of violent instability, which 
may include civil wars or coups. The second stage employs that probability as well as other 
factors to predict the specific likelihood of genocide onset three to five years in the future (they 
use Harff’s definition of genocide). The authors tested a wide range of variables, but the most 
powerful predictors for genocide onset included (in addition to instability) prior genocide, “human 
defense burden” (proportion of a population in the regular military over a given year), “executive 
constraints” (extent of checks and balances on autonomy of the executive), state-led discrimination, 
infant mortality rate, and number of neighboring state conflicts.17 This is not strictly a conditional 
model; all countries are evaluated, and there is no prior condition of violent instability that has to 
be met for inclusion in the second stage of analysis. Although violent instability is an important 
predictor of genocide, the authors avoided using this as the “gate” for inclusion in second stage. 
The benefit of a non-conditional model is that it avoids the risk of excluding some countries that do 
not meet a particular threshold but otherwise may experience genocide in the future. The authors 
find that their model predicts 82 percent of genocide onsets correctly and 79 percent of non-onset 
years correctly, which is an impressive outcome. One interesting finding is that certain economic 
factors that are highly correlated with civil war18 and general violent instability such as poverty, 
unemployment rate, unemployment change, proportion of men in the labor force, and so forth, are 
not good predictors of genocide. Economic factors are important when mediated by other political 
factors, such as type of political regime, but not on their own. Given that most post-World War II 
genocides occur in the context of civil war, revolution or coups, this means that economic factors 
predict a wider range of violent phenomena than genocide as such.
Jay Ulfelder and the Early Warning Project (EWP) have sought to produce risk assessments 
of the potential for “state-led mass killings” (rather than only geno/politicide) annually for all 
countries.19 The EWP’s approach is also nonconditional, and thus countries are not required to 
meet a certain instability threshold for inclusion. This approach combines an opinion pool and 
statistical modeling to produce assessments. The opinion pool collects country forecasts from a 
relatively large group of experts.20 The statistical component uses an “ensemble Bayesian” forecast 
that involves combining three statistical RA models and aggregating their predictions to generate 
one final probability score of mass killing per country per year. The models include 1) a combination 
of Harff’s original 2003 model on geno/politicide and Goldstone et. al. on political instability; 
and Peace Science Vol. 29, No. 4: pages 389-406; Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International 
Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48: pages 269-292.
16 Butcher, Charles R., Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Dimitri Semenovich and Arcot Sowmya. 2013a. “Understanding and 
Forecasting Political Instability and Genocide for Early Warning.” Sydney: Australian Government, Asia Pacific Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect, The University of Sydney, The University of New South Wales. Available from: www.
sydney.edu.au/arts/research/atrocity_forecasting/downloads/docs/GenocidePolicyReportGlobalLowRes_final120905.pdf 
(accessed 7 January 2015); the authors use the term “early warning” in their title in the way risk assessment is used here. 
Also see Butcher, Goldsmith, Semenovich and Sowmya 2013b.
17 Butcher et al. “Understanding and Forecasting Political Instability”, 15.
18 Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onsets.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution Vol. 50, No. 4, 508-535.
19 Early Warning Project. 2015a. Available from: http://www.earlywarningproject.com (accessed 9 June 2015); also see 
Ulfelder, Jay. 2013. “A Multimodel Ensemble to Forecast Onsets of State-sponsored Mass Killing.” American Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting. Available from: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2303048 (accessed 10 January 2015) and 
Early Warning Project. 2015d. “A New Statistical Approach to Assessing Risks of State-Led Mass Killing.” Available 
from: http://www.earlywarningproject.com/2014/01/22/a-new-statistical-approach-to-assessing-risks-of-state-led-mass-
killing (accessed 9 June 2015), where many of the technical details are laid out. The EWP also runs an annual Wiki 
survey to assess the risk of mass killing, see Early Warning Project. 2015c. “Wiki Survey.” Available from: http://www.
earlywarningproject.com/2015/01/12/relative-risks-of-state-led-mass-killing-onset-in-2015-results-from-a-wiki-survey 
(accessed 9 June 2015). For frequently updated discussions of this work, see www.dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com.
20 Early Warning Project. 2015b. “Expert Opinion Pool.” Available from: http://www.earlywarningproject.com/opinion_
pools (accessed 9 June 2015).
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2) an “elite threat” model for predicting civil wars and coups; and, 3) a “random forest” 
approach that employs the variables in the previous models as well as a few others. Ensemble 
forecasting avoids the pitfall of having to pick one “best” model when the researcher has little 
confidence for privileging one above the other since various models will each have particular 
strengths and limitations. The EWP’s ensemble model does not use specific variables to 
predict mass killing but rather averages across models, so there is no set of main predictors 
as is the case with models discussed earlier. However, Ulfelder finds that overall an ensemble 
approach produces better forecasts than using one statistical model.21 Results are updated at 
www.earlywarningproject.com. 
The Fund for Peace is a think tank that has produced an annual Fragile States Index for the 
past decade and currently covers 178 countries. The Fund also publishes a shorter watch list of 
highly fragile states based on the Index. Unlike most nongovernmental organizations involved in 
risk assessment, the Fund’s sources, coding criteria and analytical model are publicly available, 
and the model has been refined over time following periodic peer review. It is among the more 
methodologically transparent and rigorous assessments developed by a policy think tank. The 
Index defines fragile states as those that have lost control of territory or monopoly of legitimate 
use of force (the classic Weberian definition of the state), the erosion of legitimate authority to 
make collective decisions, a failure to provide public services, or the inability to interact with other 
states as a “full member of the international community” (i.e., legal sovereignty is questioned).22 
The analysis employs a framework called Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which uses 
twelve general indicators to assess the degree of state fragility. The indicators fall broadly in three 
categories: social (demographic pressures, displaced persons, group grievances, human flight); 
economic (uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline); and political and 
military (state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, elite 
factionalization, external interventions).23 Unlike the examples discussed earlier, the Index does 
not produce systematic predictions for violence or instability onset in the future; rather, it provides 
assessments of current levels of state fragility. Like Goldstone et. al.’s model, the Index focuses on 
a much broader range of instability outcomes than mass violence and genocide, though in practice 
its country watch list overlaps extensively with other watch lists.
The RA models discussed above differ in various ways. Aside from employing a variety of 
different indicators and statistical methods, they also attempt to forecast somewhat different 
phenomena: political instability, state fragility, state-sponsored mass killings, democide, or 
politicide and genocide. Nevertheless, there is significant overlap in the countries that qualify 
as high risk in each model. Table 1 shows this by model, with the fifteen highest risk countries 
listed by descending risk score in each column. Note that although these countries are “ranked” by 
model, the rankings are not meant to reflect exact risk level differences between countries; rather 
they simply show comparative levels of risk. I exclude the Goldstone et. al. country list because it 
is older than the other lists presented here, so it is not as comparable. Rost is testing the efficacy of 
models and he does not generate a list of countries, so his findings are not included either. 
What can we make of this? The table shows some consistency across models, even if specific 
country rankings differ (recall that EWP’s is an ensemble model, so it includes the 2003 version of 
the Harff model). For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia appear on all 
four lists, and Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, 
Sudan and Syria are on three. A number of countries are on two lists: Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. Of course, many other countries 
are ranked a bit lower and thus do not appear here, but show up consistently across models.
 The differences across lists are a product of the specific outcome that is being measured 
(genocide onset, state fragility, etc.) and the various model specifications. Nevertheless, the 
bundling of high-risk countries across sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and south Asia suggests 
21 Ulfelder, “A Multimodel Ensemble to Forecast Onsets of State-sponsored Mass Killing,” 15.
22 Early Warning Project. 2015a.
23 Haken, Nate, J. J. Messner, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft, Kendall Lawrence, Laura Brisard, and Felipe Umaña. 2014. 
Failed State Index 2014: The Book. Washington, D.C.: Fund for Peace.
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that many of the factors that predict one violent or disruptive outcome have some effects on others, 
though as we saw earlier there is variation in particular indicators and variables. 
Another equally important pattern emerges, which concerns regional concentrations of risk. 
The models focus on country-year as the unit of analysis, but as Martin Shaw has argued, the causes 
of genocide and similar forms of violence cannot be explained solely by country-level analysis. In 
fact, there may be broader international and regional factors that exacerbate (or mitigate) risk and 
help determine regional concentrations of violence at given historical periods.24 The lists themselves 
suggest this when mapped. Below are two global “heat” maps, which reflect the Fragile States 
Index and EWP lists in Table 1. The maps below are taken from these sources. 
In Map 1, high-risk countries are in dark red and low risk countries are in green. The map 
reveals a concentration of fragile states across Africa, the Middle East and south Asia, with generally 
moderate levels in Latin America and other parts of Asia.
24 Shaw, Martin. 2013. Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of the Late Modern World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Table 1. Highest-Risk Countries by Model1 
Harff 
(genocide and 
politicide)
Butcher et. al.
(genocide and 
politicide)
EWP 
(state-led mass 
killing)
Fragile States 
Index
Syria Central African Republic Myanmar South Sudan
Myanmar D. R. Congo Sudan Somalia
Sudan Chad Central African Republic
Central African 
Republic
Pakistan Somalia Pakistan D. R. Congo
Ethiopia Angola South Sudan Sudan
Rwanda Myanmar Somalia Chad
Zimbabwe Sri Lanka D. R. Congo Afghanistan
China Ecuador Iraq Yemen
Iran Burundi Mali Haiti
D. R. Congo Afghanistan Guinea Pakistan
Somalia Syria Afghanistan Zimbabwe
Saudi Arabia Guinea Bangladesh Guinea
Sri Lanka Cameroon Nigeria Iraq
Nigeria Uganda Ethiopia Cote d’Ivoire
Cameroon Libya Rwanda Syria
Source: Harff, “Detection: The History and Politics of Early Warning,” 97: Table 4.1; Butcher et.al, 
“Understanding and Forecasting Political Instability,” Table 1; Early Warning Project 2015e; Fund For Peace 
2015b; On the Index, the first five countries are ranked “very high alert” and the following ten are ranked 
“high alert.”  
1 Harff, “Detection: The History and Politics of Early Warning,” 97: Table 4.1; Butcher et.al, “Understanding and 
Forecasting Political Instability,” Table 1; Early Warning Project 2015e; Fund For Peace 2015b; On the Index, the first five 
countries are ranked “very high alert” and the following ten are ranked “high alert.”
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In the EWP’s map, countries in red have the highest risk of mass killing, which decreases 
through various shades of orange. High-risk countries cluster in Africa, the Middle East, and south 
Asia.
Map 1. Fragile States Index1. Source: Fund for Peace 2015b.
1  Fund For Peace. 2015b. State Fragility Index. Available from: www.ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2014 (accessed 13 
January 2015).
Map 2. EWP Model of State-Led Mass Killing1. Source: Early Warning Project 2015e. 
1 Early Warning Project. 2015e. “World Map.” Available from: http://www.earlywarningproject.com/map# (accessed 9 
June 2015).
Again, EWP’s findings show a high concentration of ongoing and likely mass killing in the 
same regions as the Index’s high-risk countries; nevertheless, because the various models do 
not systematically investigate regional or global factors, those clustering patterns are somewhat 
underexplored.25 
25 There is, for instance, a robust literature on civil war contagion effects across borders, and some on genocide and other 
forms of political violence. See Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008. Also see Harvey 2003; Escobar 2004 on global structural 
violence shaping national dynamics violence.
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Common Risk Indicators
What, then, are some of the main risk predictors for genocide and mass atrocity? They include 
several political, social and economic factors. Most of these will be unsurprising to scholars of 
genocide. Many qualitative comparative studies on the causes of genocide have had the same 
findings. Below I summarize these indicators in the risk assessment literature, though their specific 
articulation will differ across models. 
1. A history of prior genocide or mass atrocities since the end of World War II consistently 
appears as important. Where there are prior histories, especially when the perpetrator 
group was not punished or removed from power, mass atrocities are somewhat more 
likely to occur. 
2. Regime type is important. Genocide and mass atrocities are more likely in highly autocratic 
regimes than in democracies and somewhat more likely than in partially autocratic 
regimes (where non-competitive or partly competitive elections are possible, for instance). 
Governments that systematically limit or deny basic rights are unaccountable to their 
populations and respond to political contestation through force are much more likely to 
engage in genocide and related atrocities. The significance of regime type is also partly 
captured in some assessments by measuring the lack of executive constraints. 
3. Ongoing state-led discrimination. As much of the genocide studies literature has long argued, 
patterns of increasing repression against already historically targeted groups, including 
the restriction of civil and political rights as well as violent coercion, precede genocide 
and mass atrocities. This is often tied to extremist elite ideology and/or prior devaluation of the 
targeted group, though various risk assessments specify this in different ways. 
4. Political instability is also correlated with genocide and mass atrocity onset, with various 
models using different specifications of this (coup, civil war, assassinations, etc.). 
5. Ongoing domestic armed conflict, such as civil war, is correlated with genocide and other 
atrocities. This is perhaps not surprising, given that war facilitates the logistics of mass 
killing and tends to radicalize ingroup and outgroup differentiations.26
6. Armed conflict in neighboring states can also radicalize domestic politics, serve as conduits 
for arms for insurgents, and raise elites’ threat perceptions.27
7. Economic factors are somewhat more complex for forecasting. Harff has found that a low 
level of trade openness is an important predictor, but Butcher et. al. and Hazlett find that 
most economic factors are weak genocide predictors (including poverty and inequality 
levels), though some are better predictors of political instability and civil war, which in turn 
may lead to genocide and other atrocities.28 This seems to indicate that the importance of 
economic factors depends on how they are mediated by political institutions, a point well 
known in the standard genocide studies literature. Rather than looking at country-level 
information (such as national rates of inequality like the Gini coefficient), it may be more 
useful to look at economic factors subnationally, by ethnic groups and other minorities, as 
has been done in civil war research.29 
Limitations and Caveats
Statistical risk assessments have improved tremendously over the past decade and a half, as is 
illustrated by the examples above. They help provide a global snapshot of the regions of the world 
that are most likely to suffer from terrible violence, and to this extent can inform preventive policy 
by the United Nations and governments (provided, of course, the appropriate will to respond can 
26 Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. 2004. “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla 
Warfare.” International Organization Vol. 58, No. 2, 375-407. 
27 Butcher et al., “Understanding and Forecasting Political Instability.”
28 Stewart, Frances. 2013. “The Causes of Civil War and Genocide: A Comparison.” In Responding to Genocide: The Politics of 
International Action. Edited by Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 47-84. 
29 Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils Weidmann, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist 
Civil War: A Global Comparison.” American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 3, 478-495. 
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be mobilized, which is often doubtful). However, there are several limitations and caveats that 
should be raised. I discuss some of these below.
Some risk assessments use a relatively narrow definition of genocide. Defining genocide in 
narrow terms produces comparatively few cases, a challenge for statistical analyses that require 
large numbers of observations for better forecasting. For these reasons, some scholars have 
preferred to focus on “mass killings,” which as defined earlier yield comparatively many more 
cases for the purposes of analysis. 
Related to this, a host of other forms of group destructive violence are often left out of 
assessment models.30 Sheri Rosenberg and Everita Silina have documented the ways in which 
genocide may occur by “attrition,” such as the systematic denial of food and shelter or through 
forced relocations and enslavement that do not result in immediate death.31 The United Nations 
Genocide Convention also identifies a range of acts beyond direct killing that can qualify as 
genocidal, including causing seriously bodily or mental harm to the group, imposing measures 
intended to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children of one group to another.32 Naturally, 
these complex, long-term patterns of violence are much harder to model and measure than direct 
killing, but the result of excluding them may be to ignore countries that should otherwise appear 
high on watch lists. It is necessary to complement current risk assessments with regular, systematic 
assessments that take into account these other forms of violations. The Fragile States Index goes 
some distance in doing this by looking at a wide range of forms of violence and repression, but 
even here the emphasis is on measuring the relative resilience of the state.
Contemporary risk assessment models also tend to focus on very large-scale phenomena, and 
use baselines (say number of mass killings per year) for inclusion that can be rather high. A lower 
threshold and greater awareness of subnational patterns of violence, rather than just the country 
level, can provide not only a larger number of observations for analysis, but also greater sensitivity 
to cases where violence has yet to explode across the country.
Further improvements can be made to the data used in risk assessments, as Rost has argued.33 
In some cases data may be missing or are unreliable for particular countries or regions (such 
as data on infant mortality rates), but often it is data for precisely those countries that are most 
prone to mass atrocities. Fatality estimates at the beginning of a violent episode can be especially 
unreliable due to undercounts, double-counts and manipulation. Similarly, there are limitations 
to using some off-the-shelf datasets, which have conceptualization and measurement problems. 
For example, the Polity dataset, used for measuring levels of democracy and thus regime type, 
has been criticized for having a host of conceptualization problems.34 And yet it is widely used in 
quantitative research on political violence. 
Forecasting the onset of mass violence, whether genocide, mass atrocities, or related phenomena, 
always has to confront the challenge of balancing false positive and false negative predictions, 
which in turn have important implications for policy. A model should try to generate few false 
positives, or false alarms (that is, countries incorrectly forecasted to experience mass violence). Too 
many false alarms will not help analysts and policymakers in prioritizing their limited attention 
and resources. Reducing false alarms requires a high level of certainty about the likelihood of 
violence in particular countries during the given forecasting period, and this normally results in 
generating watch lists that include relatively obvious high-risk countries. However, reducing false 
positives may also mean a commensurate rise in the number of false negatives (i.e., those countries 
30 Birger Heldt’s definition of atrocities “excludes indirect deaths caused by disease, starvation and crossfire” and “other 
indirect methods.” See Heldt, “Mass Atrocities Early Warning Systems,” 13.
31 Rosenberg, Sheri P. and Everita Silina. 2013. “Genocide by Attrition: Silent and Efficient.” In Genocide Matters: Ongoing 
Issues and Emerging Perspectives. Edited by Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja. New York: Routledge, 106-126; Farmer, Paul. 
2004. “An Anthropology of Structural Violence.” Current Anthropology Vol. 45, 305-325.
32 United Nations General Assembly. 1948. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
Available from: www.treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf (accessed 3 
January 2015).
33 Rost, “Will It Happen Again?” 42, 59.
34 Goertz, Gary. 2005. Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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that were not predicted to experience mass violence during a given period but did experience it). 
So, to the extent that a model is trying to lower the number of false negatives, it risks raising the 
number of false positives, and vice versa. This is a constitutive tradeoff in forecasting, though it 
should be noted that actual future cases of mass violence (future true positives) are often today’s 
false positives.
Finally, and more generally, there is a danger that decision makers ascribe too much certainty 
to these probabilistic predictions, which can in turn shape policy choices. Part of this is an 
epistemological issue—how certain can we be of the predictions? The works discussed above are 
admirably clear about their scope of applicability and limitations. In speaking about genocide, 
Rost notes that, “for any model, picking out events that are so rare that they only occur in less than 
one percent of the cases included is difficult”.35 However, the growing tendency in policy circles 
to treat “big data” quantitative research as categorically superior to other forms of research risks 
producing a misplaced sense of forecasting accuracy for mass violence and instability. The kind of 
scientism and big data hubris that have pervaded policy planning may generate a fictitious sense 
of foreknowledge and sidelines case experts who may make crucial analytical contributions. 
Early Warning
There is no hard line between risk assessment and early warning, but as discussed earlier, early 
warning models tend to focus on short- and midterm predictions. Rather than analyzing broad 
structural conditions that point toward risk of some future instability or violence, early warnings 
include dynamic factors and are meant to be sensitive to changes in political context that may 
trigger violence. In general, countries that are deemed high-risk become the focus of early warning 
monitoring, so that risk level serves as a condition for early warning selection. As is the case with 
risk assessments, early warning models are often predicting somewhat different events—genocide, 
civil war, mass killing, mass atrocities, and the like—and thus may employ a variety of factors. 
Policymakers often emphasize that what they need is better early warning.36 Although risk 
assessments are naturally valuable, accurate and timely knowledge is especially important for 
short term preventing responses. And yet, producing reliable early warnings is extremely difficult. 
Even for high-risk countries, predicting with any degree of accuracy when violence may erupt—
especially atrocities such as mass killing and genocide – can be especially vexing. 
An important point of contention for early warning modeling concerns the relative strengths 
of various methodological approaches. Should one rely on quantitative (statistical) approaches, 
qualitative evaluations that use systematic case study comparisons, or expert-based assessments 
of single cases? Some scholars, such as Barbara Harff, have argued that quantitative models hold 
significantly more promise than the alternatives because they are open to testing and falsification. 
“Early warning efforts should be done in a systematic fashion using theoretically tested 
models—quantitative analysis—not just untested theory or experts’ insights… The social 
sciences cannot afford to depend on insiders’ knowledge or hunches and then cry “wolf” when 
there is no solid evidence that we are facing a genocide rather than some other violent event”.37 
The Fund for Peace advocates a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, but 
also remains skeptical of privileging specialized expert knowledge: 
“To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go 
beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify 
and grasp broad social trends. An interdisciplinary combination of qualitative research and 
quantitative methodologies is needed to establish patterns and acquire predictive value”.38
35 Rost, “Will It Happen Again?,” 42. 
36 Albright and Cohen. Preventing Genocide.
37 Many researchers who make this point cite the work of Philip Tetlock, who argues that expert judgment is not especially reli-
able in trying to predict trends in international politics. See Tetlock, Philip E. 2006. Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How 
Can We Know? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Harff, “Detection: The History and Politics of Early Warning,” 101. 
38 Haken et al., Failed State Index 2014, 9.
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Other scholars have argued, however, that early warning prediction requires extensive expert 
knowledge. This is so, the argument goes, because experts have a more sophisticated understanding 
of the motives and goals of various political actors and they know the political and historical 
context of the conflict. Quantitative studies reduce the complexity of conflict and risk missing 
important dynamics and events that can trigger violence, or at best provide only information that 
is too generalized to be policy-relevant in the short- and midterm.39 
The question of whether of whether quantitative, qualitative or expert-based approaches are 
superior remains unresolved, though most EW tends to be highly qualitative and dependent on 
expert interpretation (indeed, there are few early warning models in current use that are wholly or 
primarily quantitative). Nevertheless, this debate appears rather artificial. Given the difficulty of 
predicting complex violent events in the short- or midterm, it seems reasonable that a combination 
of statistical and qualitative approaches, as well as expert judgments, should be employed. 
Statistical models provide important insights into general patterns of violence onset and escalation 
through analyses of large numbers of similar cases, and they help identify what factors are the most 
important to monitor. However, qualitative assessments are necessary to develop causal models 
(rather than only correlative, typical of statistical approaches) that can assist in identifying patterns 
and triggers of violence escalation and restraint. Case experts are needed to interpret whether 
certain events may constitute violence accelerators and how events may impact the actions of 
other actors, given the specific case context. They can also assist in interpreting particular kinds of 
information that are not amenable to easy quantification, such as how ethnic or religious identities 
function in certain locations and how they may become politicized. The strongest EW approaches 
will likely be those that combine quantitative, qualitative and expert analyses. However, as Harff 
points out, quantitative early warning models are still not well developed. 
A host of early warning models exist, many of them developed by nongovernmental 
organizations, governments, and international institutions such as the United Nations, often in 
conjunction with scholars in academia.40 Many of these groups publish outlines of the EW models 
they employ, but unfortunately few of them publish specific material on methodology, such as 
how their information is gathered, how sources are evaluated, and how the factors and variables in 
their various early warning models are operationalized (that is, how evidence is interpreted in light 
of the models). Unfortunately, without further elaboration of how information is interpreted it is 
difficult to evaluate the efficacy of various early warning models, which means that the discussion 
below is somewhat briefer than that of risk assessments. Nevertheless, even though methodological 
issues are rarely addressed at length in EW analysis, the violence triggers across models appear to 
be relatively similar. Below I first canvass organizations that produce early warning reports and 
then present the most common early warning triggers.
The United Nations has been involved in early warning for a number of decades, though until 
relatively recently it had not systematically coordinated the collection of information across its 
many agencies. Information gathering for early warning already occurs in country-based and global 
offices across the UN, including in the UN Development Programme, the Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, and 
most recently the big data collection project called Global Pulse (previously the Global Impact and 
Vulnerability Alert System). Each of these offices collects information to assist its own particular 
39 Hamburg, David A. 2010. Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps Toward Early Detection and Effective Action. Boulder, CO: 
Paradigm Publishers; Stewart, Rory and Gerald Knaus. 2012. Can Intervention Work? New York: W.W. Norton. 
40 Space limitations preclude discussing many other important early warning initiatives. See the work of the Genocide 
Prevention Advisory Network available from: www.gpanet.org (accessed 5 June 2015); the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide available from: www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide 
(accessed 5 June 2015); International Alert available from: www.international-alert.org (accessed 5 June 2015); Satellite 
Sentinel Project available from: www.satsentinel.org (accessed 5 June 2015); and the Forum for Early Warning and Early 
Response available from: www.fewer-international.org (accessed 5 June 2015). The FAST early warning unit at Swisspeace 
Foundation is no longer operating, but it did produce important work, discussed in Krummenacher and Schmeidl 2001. 
US military efforts like the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) are discussed in O’Brien, Sean. 2010. “Crisis 
Early Warning and Decision Support” International Studies Review Vol. 12, 87-104.
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mandate, but until the advent of a special UN office dedicated to genocide prevention there was no 
systematic analysis of information relevant to mass atrocity prevention and detection.41 
The UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was established by 
the Security Council in 2004. In 2010, the office was expanded to include the promotion of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ principle among UN member states, and it is now called the Office 
on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (OGPRP). The mandate of the special 
adviser includes collecting existing information from the numerous branches of the UN system, 
acting as a “mechanism of early warning to the UN Secretary-General,” making recommendations 
to the UN Security Council on preventing and stopping genocide, and liaising within the UN 
system to strengthen prevention, detection and analysis efforts.42 The OGPRP recently extended its 
focus to “mass atrocity crimes,” which include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing.43 It currently uses a “framework of analysis” for mass atrocity crimes employing 
fourteen risk factors that together produce an overall early warning evaluation. The framework 
relies on the qualitative analysis of information from various UN bodies as well as NGO, news and 
scholarly sources. 
In its early days, the office was severely understaffed and under-resourced and did not seem 
to have much of an impact on policy or advocacy work.44 In recent years its staff has grown and 
become more professional, and its work is analytically more sophisticated. It produces regular 
public reports and advises the Secretary-General and Security Council, though given the sensitivity 
of its sources most of its reporting is confidential with limited circulation at the UN. Nevertheless, 
the OGPRP has emerged as an important player in the early warning field.
A number of regional organizations engage in early warning monitoring as well. These 
include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union’s Policy 
and Planning Unit in the European Council, the Continental Early Warning System in the African 
Union, The Economic Community of West African States’ ECOWARN Office, and the Department 
of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions in the Organization of American States.45 These 
organizations secure information from a variety of sources, some confidential, and produce regular 
internal analyses for policy advice and occasional public reports for broader distribution. Most of 
them do not release detailed information on their early warning models.46
In 2011, US President Barack Obama ordered the creation of the Atrocities Prevention Board 
(APB) to coordinate an inclusive government approach to risk assessment and early warning.47 
The APB was established the following year and includes regular monthly meetings of high-level 
41 Zenko, Micah and Rebecca R. Friedman. 2011. “UN Early Earning For Preventing Conflict,” International Peacekeeping 
Vol. 18, No. 1, 21-37.
42 United Nations Security Council. 2001. Resolution S/Res/1366. Available from: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/
SC_Resolution1366_31Aug2001.pdf (accessed January 6, 2015).
43 United Nations Security Council. 2001. Resolution S/Res/1366. Available from: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/
SC_Resolution1366_31Aug2001.pdf (accessed January 6, 2015). 
44 Hehir, Aidan. 2010. “An Analysis of Perspectives on the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 5, No. 3, 258-276. 
45 See the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Early Warning and Early Action available from: www.
osce.org/secretariat/107485 (accessed 15 January 2015); European Union Policy and Planning Unit, The Early Warning and 
Conflict Prevention Capability of the Council of the European Union available from: www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/0611prelisbon.pdf 
(accessed 15 January 2015); African Union, Continental Early Warning System available from www.peaceau.org/uploads/
early-warning-system-1.pdf (accessed 15 January 2015); Economic Community of West African States, ECOWARN 
available from: www.ecowarn.org (accessed 26 March 2015); Organization of American States, Department of Sustainable 
Democracy and Special Missions, available from: www.oas.org/en/spa/dsdsm/ (accessed 15 January 2015). A useful 
overview is found in Wulf, Herbert and Tobias Debiel 2009. “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: Tools for 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Regional Organizations? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF 
and PIF.” London: Crisis States Research Centre.
46 Military and intelligence organizations also produce early warning analyses, but little detailed information is available 
on these efforts. See Albright and Cohen, 24-25; Kriendler, John. 2006. “NATO Intelligence and Early Warning.” Conflict 
Studies Research Centre at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Vol. 06, No. 13: pages 1-10; Hamburg, Preventing 
Genocide, 256-264.
47 White House. 2011. Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities PSD-10. Available from: https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive-mass-atrocities (accessed December 20, 2015).
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officials from various governmental agencies to share information, identify atrocity risks and 
develop coherent policy responses.48 The APB focuses on potential or ongoing high-risk cases 
that may otherwise be missed, rather than major cases such as Syria already receiving significant 
attention.49 Little is known of the APB’s effectiveness, however; its meetings and findings are 
confidential and it has not reached out in any sustained fashion to human rights NGOs or the 
broader human rights scholarly community. Its risk assessment and early warning models are not 
available (though they are reportedly based on Harff 2003 with some adjustments and extensive 
qualitative analysis).50 Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human 
Rights at the State Department sits on the APB and has stated that the Board “sounded the alarm” 
on Burundi in 2015, Islamic State attacks on the Yazidi in 2014, and the Central African Republic in 
2013.51 However, the lack of information on the ABP’s work, including the kind of RA/EW models 
it employs, makes it very difficult to evaluate the Board’s overall impact.
The nongovernmental organization Genocide Watch, founded and run by noted genocide 
scholar Gregory Stanton, employs a ten-stage model of analysis (updated from eight stages). The 
ten stages range from “classification” of groups into exclusive categories through “extermination” 
and finally “denial.” The stages are “predictable but not inexorable,” nor are they linear.52 The 
model is based on the scholarly literature and is especially helpful for case study work. Genocide 
Watch releases a regular list of countries at high risk and also sends out early warning alerts when 
“politicide or genocide is imminent” and declares “genocide emergencies” when genocide is 
underway. Although Genocide Watch uses the United Nations definition of genocide (which is 
notoriously narrow and problematic for policy purposes),53 in practice the organization covers a 
wide range of violent phenomena, closer to the more inclusive “mass atrocity crimes.”54 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) monitors conflicts around the globe through a network 
of regional offices. The ICG produces the monthly report Crisis Watch on high-risk countries as well 
as occasional early warning “crisis alerts” on specific countries, the latter including but not limited 
to genocide and mass atrocities. It is among the best-known NGOs devoted to early warning 
and its large staff of area experts and field specialists mostly employ qualitative methods.55 The 
ICG consults regularly with policymakers and news media. Most of the cases it identifies appear 
on other risk watch lists and early warning lists, though the ICG does not publish its analytical 
framework or details of its methodology.
The Canadian Sentinel Project has regular early warning evaluations of a number of high-risk 
countries and regions around the world. Like many NGOs, the Sentinel Project uses traditional 
news media and expert interviews as sources, but it is particularly noteworthy for using new 
technologies in conjunction with partners on the ground to generate information for early warning 
analysis. The organization has used a risk profile based on Stanton’s earlier “eight stages of 
genocide” to identify “situations of concern” (essentially high-risk cases), and then applies an 
early warning model to monitor those cases. Monitoring is done through the Conflict Tracking 
System (CTS), a data visualization program that tags events by relevant early warning indicators. It 
employs the popular Ushahidi crowdsourcing platform to process data from a variety of sources.56 
48 The APB is composed of 11 government agencies and is chaired by the National Security Council. There are also more 
frequent inter-agency meetings by lower-level staff. 
49 Norris and Malknecht, Atrocities Prevention Board.
50 Private communication, State Department official. September 15, 2015.
51 Sewall, Sarah. 2015. “Charting the US Atrocities Prevention Board’s Progress.” Available from: http://www.cfr.org/
human-rights/charting-us-atrocities-prevention-boards-progress/p36332 (accessed 22 December 2015).
52 Genocide Watch. 2015a. “The 10 Stages of Genocide.” Available from: www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/
tenstagesofgenocide.html (accessed 15 January 2015).
53 Verdeja, Ernesto. 2013. “Genocide: Debating Definitions.” In Responding to Genocide: The Politics of International Action. 
Edited by Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja, pages 21-46. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
54 Genocide Watch. 2015b. “Countries at Risk” Available from: http://genocidewatch.net/alerts-2/new-alerts/ (accessed 15 
January 2015).
55 Communication from Isabelle Arradon, Deputy Chief Policy Officer and Director of Research, ICG. February 17, 2015.
56 Sentinel Project. 2015a. Conflict Tracking System. Available from: https://thesentinelproject.org/2015/02/11/the-sentinel-
project-launches-conflict-tracking-system/ (accessed 9 June 2015).
Predicting Genocide and Mass Atrocities
©2016     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1314
27
The Sentinel Project focuses on a relatively small number of cases, and much of its current work is 
centered on local-level interventions rather than broad-based EW, but the CTS is very promising 
and should influence future early warning efforts.57 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRP) is an NGO based in New York 
that promotes the strengthening of the responsibility to protect principle in the United Nations 
system. Among a variety of initiatives, it publishes a bimonthly report on “populations at risk” of 
mass atrocity crimes, with special emphasis on a select number of countries in Africa, the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia. Its early warning work is mostly focused on those countries and is largely 
directed at government and UN policymakers, news media and other human rights advocacy 
organizations. It is a particularly good source of material for specific countries. 
Common Early Warning Indicators
These various organizations employ a wide range of early warning frameworks, but a close reading 
of their many reports reveals that the indicators they use tend to overlap. These indicators may 
apply to state forces, insurgent forces, or both, depending on the specific indicator.58 The most 
common ones include:
1. increased hate media, which may sanction the use of violence against already vulnerable 
civilian groups;
2. public rallies and popular mobilization against vulnerable groups;
3. upcoming elections, which may be perceived as threatening to ruling elites;
4. public commemorations of past crimes or contentious historical events that exacerbate 
tensions between groups;
5. rapid change in government leadership, such as through assassination or coup, which can 
create a power vacuum and result in violent contestation for political power;
6. natural disasters, which may overstretch already weak state capacity and embolden 
opposition groups;
7. sharp increase in repressive state practices, including removal of political, religious, civil and 
economic rights, stripping of citizenship; shift from selective to widespread patterns of 
repression;
8. arrest, torture, disappearance or killing of political, religious, or economic leaders;
9. physical segregation or separation of the targeted group from the broader population; forced 
removal or settlement of populations;
10. increase in weapons transfers to security forces or rebels;
11. rapid increase in opposition capacity, raising their perceived threat, or conversely a rapid 
decline in opposition capacity, which may serve as an opportunity to destroy them and 
their “civilian base”;
12. deployment of security forces against previously targeted civilian groups;
13. commencement/resumption of armed conflict between government forces and rebels;
14. spillover of armed conflict from neighboring countries;
15. nowhere for targeted civilian groups to flee as violence escalates.
Limitations and Caveats
Much like risk assessments, early warning models have made impressive advances in the past 
decade and a half. The organizations discussed above today produce important analytical and 
advocacy work on potential crises around the world, and thanks to them decision makers are much 
better informed than in the past. However, early warning models do face some limitations. Below 
I identify a few of these.
The first concerns limitations in information. New information technologies including social 
media allow us to monitor crises essentially in “real time,” so that older problems of limited data 
57 Sentinel Project. 2015b. Hakika. Available from: https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/02/17/how-it-works-una-hakika 
(accessed 9 June 2015).
58 Fein, Helen. 2007. Human Wrongs and Wrongs (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 134-135.
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are less pressing, though they are still a problem in some places (such as in northeastern Central 
African Republic during the spring 2013 phase of the civil war). Nevertheless, as Birger Heldt has 
argued, the surfeit of information raises challenges for verifying its accuracy and relevance; for 
instance, information may be unrepresentative (e.g., primarily from urban versus rural areas or 
elite versus non-elite sources), unverifiable, or willfully misrepresented.59 Triangulating sources can 
address some of these concerns, but in rapidly changing political contexts this is often hard to do.
It can be especially difficult to interpret information during so-called complex emergencies, 
conditions that combine ongoing internal conflict with population displacements, existing food 
insecurity and “fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions.”60 It is exceptionally 
hard to know when violent tipping points are going to occur under such already precipitous 
conditions that have their own complex causes and vectors, which often may reinforce one another.61
In addition to these data and complexity problems, there is generally little information available 
on how early warning models are designed and used. As discussed earlier, many organizations that 
conduct early warning monitoring share relatively little about how they reach their conclusions, 
which makes it difficult to assess their strengths and limitations. Given the grave risks of false 
negative predictions, and to a lesser extent false positives, we need greater clarity on how violence 
triggers and accelerators are framed and evidence interpreted. This would allow comparisons 
across models, and thus advance our knowledge about which indicators and models work best. 
Greater transparency would also help illuminate how analyst biases shape interpretations of 
conflicts.
Early warnings must be “actionable”; that is, they must be analyses that decision makers can 
translate into concrete preventive policies. On this count, early warning models have been mixed. 
Some are particularly useful, such as the alerts by the International Crisis Group or the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, but others can be vague and unhelpful for making sense 
of complex crisis events. There are of course limits to how actionable they can be, but we do not 
appear to be there yet. 
A final point concerns unpredictability itself. As the UN notes in its own atrocity prediction 
work, “It can also happen that unpredictable events or circumstances aggravate conditions or 
spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, prompting the perpetration of atrocity crimes”.62 Some 
events prove to be unpredictable triggers; there is simply a limit point to knowing how and when 
things will unfold, and this uncertainty counsels some caution about our abilities to predict events. 
These are important limitations, but overall there have been marked improvements in early 
warning monitoring since the 1990s, and our knowledge today is well ahead of where it was 
twenty years ago. Further research should continue to pursue these successes and ensure that early 
warning analysis continues to be policy-relevant. 
 
Conclusion
This article has canvassed contemporary risk assessment and early warning approaches in 
contemporary conflict prevention. Scholars, human rights groups, governments and international 
organizations have made impressive advances in identifying the main indicators of mass violence 
in its many forms for policy purposes. The article has also highlighted some areas for further 
development and advised realistic expectations about what degree of predictive accuracy we 
should expect. Of course, the ultimate challenge concerns whether political leaders will take these 
warnings seriously. 
59 Heldt, Birger. 2012. “Mass Atrocities Early Warning Systems: Data Gathering, Data Verification, and Other Challenges.” 
Guiding Principles of the Emerging Architecture Aiming At the Prevention of Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity. 
Available from: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2028534 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028534 (accessed 23 January 2015). 22.
60 World Health Organization. 2015. “Environmental Health in Emergencies.” Available from: www.who.int/environmen-
tal_health_emergencies/complex_emergencies/en/ (accessed 14 January 2015).
61 Heldt, Birger. 2013. “Genocide Intent and Randomness of Killings of Civilians.” Available from: www.ssrn.com/2138171 
(accessed 22 December 2014).
62 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework for Analysis of Atrocity 
Crimes, 17.
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